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JULY-AUGUST, 1962
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ZONING
LAW IN COLORADO
By MAXINE KuRTz*
The Colorado Supreme Court developed a significant body of
zoning law in the period from July, 1960 through the end of 1961.
This article is a review of this series of cases, of the relation of these
cases to earlier Colorado decisions, and to a limited extent, of the
Colorado position as compared to the law in the nation generally.
Zoning is the division of land into districts. The essence of zon-
ing regulation is the control of use of land in these districts. Col-
lateral regulations govern such subjects as the size and bulk of
buildings and the open space required on the site. This distinction
between use regulations and other regulations is recognized by
legislatively imposed limitations which deny the board of adjust-
ment power to grant so-called "use variances," and which permit
the board to only grant variances in setbacks, bulk, and other
similar regulations." This distinction was also implicit in the ma-
jority opinion in the Denver Buick case,2 when the Colorado court
invalidated two districts with essentally the same use lists, but with
different requirements in other respects.
I. ZONING AmENDMENT STANDARDS
One of the significant advances in Colorado zoning law in the
period under consideration was the evolution of standards for
measuring the validity of zoning amendments. Five tests were
established by the courts:
1. The amendment must promote a public purpose;
2. The amendment must further the comprehensive plan;
3. The denial of an amendment will not be deemed confis-
catory if the price for the land as now zoned is greater
than the purchase price;
4. The denial of an amendment will not be deemed un-
reasonable or discriminatory solely because of the exist-
ence of limited numbers of nonconforming uses in the
zone; and
5. The denial of an amendment will not be deemed un-
reasonable solely because of proximity of the applicant's
land to a heavily traveled street or to different zoning
across such a street.
Although some of these matters were decided in cases prior to 1960,
the subjects were developed in detail in the recent cases.
* June graduate, University of Denver College of Law.
1 E.g., Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code J 611.6-4(2) (a) (1956): " ... No variance shall
be authorized hereunder unless the Board shall find that all of the following conditions exist: . . .
(a-1). That the variance will not authorize the operation of a use other than those uses specifically
enumerated as Uses by Right for the district in which is located the property for which the variance
is sought; . . " See also Arnebergh, Variances (American Society of Planning Officials, Chicago,
mimeo, 1951).




As an exercise of the police power, zoning is a tool to accom-
plish affirmative ends.3 The Colorado zoning enabling act for muni-
cipalities 4 and the Denver city charter' both provide:
Purposes in view.-Such regulations shall be made in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen
congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic and
other dangers; to promote health and general welfare; to
provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding
of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate
the adequate provisions of transportation, water, sewerage,
schools, parks and other public requirements. Such regulations
shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other
things, as to the character of the district and its peculiar suita-
bility for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the
value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of
land throughout [such municipality].
The statute and the charter provisions were enacted in the mid-
1920's and have not been amended since. Both were the result of a
standard enabling act.6
A similar provision is found in the Colorado county zoning
enabling act 7 of 1939, and this, too, has not been amended. The
purposes in this instance are somewhat differently stated and are
considerably broader in scope:
Public welfare to be promoted.-Such regulations shall be
designed and enacted for the purpose of promoting the health,
safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity or welfare of
the present and future inhabitants of the state, including the
lessening of congestion in the streets or roads or reducing the
waste of excessive amounts of roads, securing safety from fire
and other dangers, providing adequate light and air, classifi-
cation of land uses, and distribution of land development and
utilization, protection of the tax base, securing economy in
governmental expenditures, fostering the state's agricultural
and other industries, and the protection of both urban and
nonurban development.
The court dealt squarely with the municipal zoning enabling
act in the case of Clark v. Boulder.' After quoting Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 139-60-3 (1953) in full, the court held an amendment to the city
zoning ordinance to be unconstitutional because it failed to promote
any of the statutory purposes.9
The earlier Colorado cases dealing with the subject of public
purpose in zoning are more than thirty years old. At the time when
most of these cases were decided, the United States Supreme Court
had not considered the issue, and Colorado was aligned with the
3 Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 351, 255 Poc. 443,446 (1927): "it was held in
Miller v. Board of Public Works, . . . to which we agree, that zoning ordinances have a much
wider scope than mere suppression of offensive uses of property, and act not only negatively, but
affirmatively for the promotion of the public welfare."
4Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-60-3 (1953).
5 Denver City Charter § 81.15 (1960 Compilation)..
6Advisory Committee on Zoning, United States Deportment of Commerce, A Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act Under Which Municipalities May Adopt Zoning Regulations §3 (Rev. ed. 1926).
7 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 106-2-16 (1953).
8362 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1961).
9 Id. at 163.
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states which held that the public purposes of zoning were not
strong enough to support zoning legislation.
In the 1910 case of Curran Bill Posting & Distrib. Co. v. City of
Denver,10 the court could find no public necessity for a provision
prohibiting the erection of billboards within 10 feet of a structure,
and commented that this "is an unwarranted invasion of private
rights and cannot be tolerated."'"
Three years later, in the case of Willison v. Cooke,12 the court
was reviewing a Denver ordinance establishing a residential dis-
trict, within which the establishment of a business or a change of
the prevailing setback lines required neighborhood consent. Plain-
tiff wanted to build a business building on the corner of E. Colfax
Ave. (a major highway) and Williams St. (a minor street) without
taking any setback on Williams St. and without securing any con-
sents. The court held: "A store building in a residence section of the
city is not desirable from an aesthetic point of view; but restrictions
for this purpose alone cannot be upheld, as it is only those having
for their object the safety and welfare of the public which justifies
restricting a use of property by the owner."u3 The court also held
that the setback had no relation to public welfare. The result was
one commonly reached in situations of this kind, but the ground
has usually been considered an invalid delegation of legislative
authority to a small group of citizens.
The first of the Hedgcock cases, decided in 1932,14 related to a
different ordinance, but the facts were similar. Plaintiff wanted
to build a business building on the corner of E. Colfax and Adams
St. and did not want to comply with a prevailing setback line on
Adams St. The court cited the Willison case 15 as controlling and
added: "We are not unmindful that the Willison case was decided
before the enactment of the zoning ordinance invoked by Williams
in justification of his act, but we note no difference in principle."1 6
The 1924 Weicker case 17 involved a Denver ordinance requiring
approval by the city council for specified uses, including a construc-
tion of a warehouse. In this case, the plaintiff wanted to erect a
warehouse on East Colfax Ave. and Vine St. The council refused
the permit and specified five grounds for the decision. These related
to the building being dark at night, the noise, the excessive height
of the building, the added danger of pests and rodents, and the
congregation of children around warehouses to the detriment of
the public morals. Clearly, this was an attempt by the city council
to provide a basis for a determination of public purpose for the
regulation. The court, in a brief decision, refuted the findings of
the city council and observed that insofar as the height limits were
concerned, an ordinance of general applicability was needed to
have valid regulations.
Of the four cases cited above, three were decided before the
10 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910).
11 Id. at 230, 107 Pac. at 265.
12 54 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828 (1913).
13 Id. at 329, 130 Pac. at 832.
14 Hedgcock v. People ex rel. Reed, 91 Colo. 155, 13 P.2d 264 (1932).
15 Willison v. Cooke, supro note 12.
16 Supra nete 14, at 158, 13 P.2d at 264.




United States Supreme Court upheld zoning ordinances in 1926,18
and before Colorado upheld zoning in this state in the following
year. 19 Although the reasoning in these early cases was rejected
by the United States Supreme Court,20 the Colorado court in the
Colby case commented: "Even so, we do not apprehend that we
are now offending the rule of stare decisis, as applied to any of
our previous decisions. We are only applying old principles to new
conditions, or to the changed facts of modern life.''21 The cases of
Beszedes v. Board of Comm'rs,22 decided in 1947, and Hoskinson V.
Arvada,23 decided in 1957, differentiated the Willison, Hedgcock,
and Weicker cases, essentially limiting them to their facts. Never-
theless, the majority opinion in the Denver Buick case,2 4 decided
in 1960, cited the Willison and Hedgcock cases as precedent.
Nationally, the public purpose doctrine of the Clark case is well
recognized.25 As a philosophical proposition, this recognition of the
interest of the general public in zoning matters would seem to be
the better position from a constitutional standpoint. The source of
the zoning power is the police power, and usually it is exercised for
the general welfare. (See for example the quotation from the Colo-
rado county zoning enabling act above.) The alternative position
is logically either legislative mediation of disagreement on land use
between adjacent land owners or legislation for the private benefit
of individuals. In either event, the resultant legislation is basically
private legislation, and probably invalid.26
B. Furtherance of the Comprehensive Plan
As noted earlier, both the city enabling act and the Denver
city charter require that the zoning be in accordance with a com-
prehensive plan. In the standard wording quoted therein, the use
of the conjunctive "and" would indicate that requiring the zoning
ordinance to be in accordance with a comprehensive plan is a
separate requirement in addition to the requirement that a public
purpose be served. When the comprehensive plan is not found,
the inconsistent amendment is termed a "spot zone. '27 Spot zoning
is invalid in Colorado, according to a series of three recent decisions.
In the 1959 case of Holly Dev., Inc. v. Board of County
Comm'rs,28 the court was dealing with a proposed increase in
18 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
19 Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927).
20 Supra note 18, at 390-95. While the Colorado cases are not specifically cited by the Supreme
Court in the group stating the narrow view, the trial court cited the Willison case as being in this
group (297 Fed. 317).
21 Colby v. Board of Adjustment, supra note 19, at 353, 255 Pac. at 446. Compare the similar
comment by the United States Supreme Court in the Euclid case, 272 U.S. at 386.
22 116 Colo. 123, 128, 178 P.2d 950, 953 (1947).
23 136 Colo. 450, 453, 319 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1957).
24 City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 131, 132, 347 P.2d 919, 926,
927 (1960).
25 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.19 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 1 Metzenbaum,
Zoning § 88 (2d ed. 1955 and Supp. 1961); 2 Metzenboum, Zoning § 1517(2d ed. 1955 and Supp.
1961); 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning § 2-2 (3d ed. 1960); Rhyne, Municipal Law 811 (1957);
58 Am. Jur. Zoning §§ 25, 26 (1948); 101 CJ.S. Zoning § 2 (1958).
26 E.g., Colo. Const. art. V, § 25.
27 Clark v. Boulder, 362 P.2d 160, 162 (1961). See also 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 5
25.83 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 1 Metzenboum, Zoning 521, 538 (2d ed. 1955, ond Supp.
1961); 2 Metzenbaum, Zoning § 1517 (2d ed. 1955, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Plan.
ning ch. 26 (3d ed. 1960); Rhyne, Municipal Law 825 (1957); 1 Yokely, Zoning Law and Practice §§
90-95 (2d ed. 1953, and Supp. 1961); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 263 (1957); 58 Am. Jur. Zoning J 39 (1948);
101 C.J.S. Zoning § 34 (1958); 39A Words and Phrases 535, "Spot zone," "Spot zoning" (1953, Supp.
1961).




density of a residential area from 2 acres per dwelling unit to 1
acre per dwelling unit. Here the court pointed out that there had
been no change in conditions from the time when the comprehen-
sive zoning plan was adopted, and that others in the viginity had
built relying upon the original zoning. Absent a change in condi-
tions, the court declared, there was no justification for re-zoning
amendments.
This principle was carried one step further in the case of
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business zoning on several occasions, and had successively been
granted more and more dense residential zoning. Finally, he was
29 362 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1961).
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granted his business zoning on the fourth try. In this case, the court
pointed out that even though this zoning was an extension of an
existing business zone, the amendment had all the earmarks of being
a change for the benefit of the landowner, rather than a change
"in furtherance of the comprehensive plan." As a spot-zone, this
amendment was invalid.
In the most recent case, Board of County Comm'rs v. Shaffer,
30
the Colorado Supreme Court found itself confronted with lower
court decrees allowing four different zones at the intersection of
Wadsworth Blvd. and W. 35th Avenue in Jefferson County. (See
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out with considerable emphasis that spot zoning is just as invalid
when the courts do it as when the legislative bodies do it.
Three earlier cases laid the ground work for these decisions:
Colby v. Board of Adjustment,3' in 1927, City of Colorado Springs
v. Miller,32 in 1934, and Hoskinson v. City of Arvada,33 in 1957.
30 367 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1961).
31 81 Colo. 344, 255 Poc. 443 (1927).
32 95 Colo. 337, 36 P.2d 161 (1934).
33 136 Colo. 450, 319 P.2d 1090 (1957).
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The Colby case,3 4 as mentioned earlier, was important primarily
for its ruling on the issue of the constitutionality of zoning ordi-
nances in Colorado. In this case, the plaintiff wanted to operate a
brickyard in a residential zone. The court noted the erection of a
nearby school and the presence of a "highly desirable residential
section" in the vicinity. In analyzing the situation, the court ob-
served: "A full perspective, however, in a case like this, requires
not only that the present be depicted, but that the future be en-
visaged. The evidence shows that experience has demonstrated
that other localities within the city, at one time no more promising
than those surrounding the brickyard, are now exclusively resi-
dential districts, occupied with beautiful and costly homes. '35
In the Colorado Springs v. Miller case,3 6 Mr. Justice Holland,
writing for the court, pointed out:
It is not apparent from the record that Miller's property
has been singled out by the council or the board, for differ-
ent application of the restrictions than that applied to any
other property so situated. Because the council or the board
did not do an unreasonable thing by exempting his com-
paratively small area of ground in the center of a residence
zone and permitting it to be treated as property in a com-
mercial zone, he complains. His complaint, in this respect,
is as impressive as an argument in favor of the validity and
reasonableness of the ordinance as it relates to the general
scheme attempted to be established by the zoning process.37
The Hoskinson case 38 involved one acre of land in the midst of a
residential area, upon which land the plaintiff wanted to build a
shopping center. The court quotes the language set forth above
from the Miller case to dispose of the complaint that the ordinance
was discriminatory.
The first sentence of the quotation from the Miller case was
the court's basis for differentiating it from the second Hedgcock
34 Supra note 31.
35 Supra note 31, at 351, 255 Pac. at 446.
36 Supra note 32.
37 Supra note 32, at 339, 36 P.2d at 162.
38 Supra note 33.
MARSOLEK'S HARDWARE & APPLIANCE STORE
Complete stock of Radios, Sporting Goods, Garden Supplies, Points,
Hardware, Television Sets, Hi-Fi Phonographs and Records
Radio and TV repair - 90 Day Guarantee
2606-16 E. Colfax FR 7-2764
Across from East High School
Open Evenings Until 8:00 P.M., Sundays 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.
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case.39 In the latter case, the court was dealing with a small busi-
ness area at the intersection of East 23rd Ave. and Dexter St. in
Denver. The city had admitted that this property was treated
differently than other land similarly situated in Denver, because
this land was zoned for Residence A, when even smaller areas
developed for business use elsewhere in the city were all zoned
business. The court held that this discriminatory treatment was
erroneous, but went on to limit its ruling to the specific facts. This
ruling was an application of the familiar axiom that in any classifi-
cation scheme, matters similar in character should be similarly
treated. Applied more specifically to the subject matter of zoning,
the rule might be stated as requiring that the comprehensive zoning
plan have definite standards for district mapping, uniformly applied
to the area being zoned. The provisions in the Denver zoning ordi-
nance establishing minimum areas for the various zones40 were
in part designed to meet this problem.
A minor problem in applying the criterion of "furtherance of
the comprehensive plan" is the determination of what constitutes
the comprehensive plan. Mr. Justice Sutton in the Clark case refers
to the overall zoning scheme. 41 Mr. Justice Day in the Shaffer
case,42 discusses a plan as apparently a separate document. Early
writers,43 and most courts44 have held that the comprehensive
plan was embodied in the zoning ordinance and map. The emphasis
was on the word "comprehensive," and the tests were whether
or not the entire community was zoned, and whether or not the
ordinance encompassed all land uses. More recently, some of the
authorities on zoning law have suggested that the term "compre-
hensive plan" refers to a separate document, and that the zoning
ordinance per se is a legal device for executing that plan.45 Some
recent statutes reflect this idea. 46 Colorado has not ruled on this
matter directly.
C. Limited Applicability of "Confiscatory" Zoning
The claim that a zone district is void because it violates the due
process clause 47 and the just compensation clause 48 of the constitu-
tion is used so often by plaintiffs complaining of their zoning that
the claim is almost automatically part of zoning cases.
In the recent case of Clark v. Boulder,49 Mr. Justice Sutton
disposed of the argument of confiscatory zoning by pointing out
tersely: "That property may not be used as profitably for residential
39 Hedgcock v. People ex 'el. Arden Realty & Inv. Co., 98 Colo. 522, 57 P.2d 891 (1936).
40 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code F 618.2.3 (1956).
41 Clark v. Boulder, 362 P.2d 160, 162 (Colo. 1961).
42 Board of County Comm'rs v. Shoffer, 367 P.2d 751, 753 (Colo. 1961).
43 E.g., Bassett, Zoning 90 (2d ed. 1940); Metzenbaum, Zoning 20 (1930); Rathkopf, Planning and
Zoning § 7a (2d ed. 1949); Yokely, Zoning Law and Practice § 53 (1948).
44 Cases cited in 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.79 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961);
1 Metzenbaum, Zoning 19 (2d ed. 1955, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning ch. 9
(3d ed. 1960); 58 Am. Jur. Zoning §§ 27, 34 (1948); 101 C.J.S. Zoning §§ 30, 87 (1958).
45 Harr, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154 (1955). See also
McBride & Babcock, The "Master Plan"-A Statutory Prerequisite to a Zoning Ordinance, 12 Zoning
Digest (Z.D.) 353 (Nov. 1960); Harr & Mytelka, Planning and Zoning, 13 Z.D. 33 (Feb. 1961); Boebele,
Horse Sense About Zoning and the Master Plan, 13 Z.D. 209 (Aug. 1961).. 46 Indiana Planning and Zoning Act, 10 Burns Ind. Stat. Anno. §§ 53-701 to 53-794 as amended
(1951, Supp. 1962); Washington 1959 County Planning Enabling Act, Wash. Sess. Laws 1959. See
also proposed Pennsylvania Zoning Act, and Proposal of Illinois State Bar Ass'n Zoning Comm.,
cited in McBride & Babcock, supra note 42. Contra West's Anno. Calif. Codes, Government: § 65803(1955).
47 E.g., Colo. Const. art. II, 125; U.S. Const. amendment XIV, § 1.
48 E.g., Colo. Const. art. II, § 15.
49 362 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1961).
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purposes as for commercial use, furnishes no justification for special
treatment thereof.
' 50
The leading case among the recent decisions was decided at
about the same time as the Clark case. This was the case of Baum v.
City & County of Denver,"' in which the court dealt squarely with
the issue of what constitutes evidence of "confiscatory" zoning. In
this case, the plaintiff owned a full city block of land, bounded on
one side by Sheridan Boulevard, a regional highway, and on the
other three sides by minor streets. Plaintiff wanted to develop this
land as a shopping center, but it was zoned for single family resi-
dential use. In support of his claim of the unreasonableness and
confiscatory nature of the zoning, the plaintiff presented testimony
that the value of the property for residential purposes was between
$24,500 and $28,000; and that the value of the property for com-
mercial purposes was between $100,000 and $125,000. He had also
testified that he had purchased the property seven years earlier
for $8,728. The court pointed out: "Since the Euclid decision courts
have held that the due process and just compensation clauses of
the Federal or State constitution do not require that a landowner
be permitted to make the best, maximum or most profitable use
of his property. 5 2 The opinion compared the purchase price of
$8,700 with the estimated value for residential development of
$28,000, and added: "Plaintiff's conclusion that such a substantial
increase in value is nevertheless confiscatory does violence to the
rules of logic and finds little support in legal principles. '53
In Frankel v. Denver,54 the petitioner presented evidence on
the difference in value between property zoned for single family
residential use and property zoned for apartments. The court noted
that the land had appreciated by 4 in value from the original
purchase price to the value under single family residence zoning,
and held the rule of the Baum case to be determinative of this issue.
The same issue was raised again a few months later in the
case of Board of County Comm'rs v. Shaffer.55 No dollar figures
were stated in the opinion, but apparently evidence was produced
showing that land would be more valuable if zoned for business
than if zoned for residence. In this opinion, the court held that the
ruling of the Baum case was determinative of this case as well.
Four earlier cases are in accord with this present position of
the court. The earliest was the 1927 case of Colby v. Board of Ad-
justment.5 6 In this case, the plaintiff claimed that his property was
being confiscated because of the residential zoning which prevented
its development as a brickyard. The court did not quote any figures,
but it compared the situation with the facts in the case of Hada-
check v. Los Angeles, 57 which were very similar. The United States
Supreme Court held in that case that difference in value between
about $800,000 for a brickyard as compared to about $60,000 for
residential purposes was not confiscatory. The Colorado court
pointed out that the amount of the difference in the Hadacheck case
50 Id. at 162.
51 363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961).
52 Id. at 693.
53 Ibid.
54 363 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1961).
55 367 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1961).
56 81 Colo. 344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927).
57 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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was "tremendously in excess of the loss claimed here." The Colo-
rado court then ruled that the decision in the Hadacheck case was
controlling in the Colby case.
In the 1934 case of City of Colorado Springs v. Miller,5 the
plaintiff had presented evidence on the relative value if zoned for
residence and if zoned for business. (The figures were not set out
in the opinion.) The court observed:
The claim that the application of the ordinance to
Miller's property would amount to confiscation and deprive
him thereof without due process of law is without merit.
The evidence settles itself to one proposition, that is, the
only loss suffered by Miller is his being deprived of the
chance to profit by the increased value of his property for
business uses. To him the ordinance is satisfactory if it
deprives others of the same opportunity and thereby en-
hances his values, but wrong, if he is not allowed to be
made the exception. One who owns, or one who acquires,
property, must be ever mindful of the right of the state
or city to exercise its legislative authority for the common
good. The ordinance is not unreasonable as it relates to the
property involved.5 9
In the 1957 case of Hoskinson v. Arvada, ° the facts were similar
to those in the Miller case, and the court held that the rule of the
Miller case was determinative of the "confiscation" issue here.
The 1942 case of People ex rel. Friedman v. Webber6' indicated
that a drop in assessed value on the property of more than half
during the preceding twelve years was a factor taken into consider-
ation in declaring the zoning to be confiscatory.
D. Effect of Non-Conforming Uses
In the Frankel case,6 2 the Colorado court established the rule:
"The existence of non-conforming uses within the R-1 district does
not affect the validity of the classification, particularly where such
uses are few in number. 6 3 This case involved a vacant lot between
58 95 Colo. 337, 36 P.2d 161 (1934).
59 Id. at 340, 36 P.2d at 162.
60 136 Colo. 450, 319 P.2d 1090 (1957).
61 110 Colo. 161, 132 P.2d 183 (1942). It should be noted (1) that assessed value probably
should not be used as evidence of market value: Fort Collins Dev. Co. v. France, 41 Colo. 512, 522,
92 Pac. 953, 956 (1907); and (2) that it is questionable if the zoning was necessarily responsible
for the decline in value, considering the economic conditions during the period in question.
62 Frankel v. Denver, 363 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1961).






two non-conforming apartment buildings in a single family resi-
dence zone. These were the only two non-conforming uses in an
area of approximately 3 blocks. (See map 3.) This degree of non-
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conformance was not deemed to be sufficient to establish the in-
validity of the zoning classification.
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In the earlier case of City of Colorado Springs v. Miller,64 the
subject property was located between a store and an alley, with the
opposite corner being occupied by a building with dwelling units
on the upper floor, and business on the ground floor. (See map 4.)
Foelanero St.
VAANT BUS/NESS REIDENCE,
DRUG AREA ON GROIND WITH1 BUSINE55
45' 51ORE BETWEEN FLOOR, IN SEPARATE





COLORADO SPRINGS V. MILLER
Here, too, the court held that the degree of non-conformance was
insufficient to make the residential zoning unreasonable.
In the leading early Colorado case of Colby v. Board of Adjust-
ment,65 plaintiff's land was located near a non-conforming brick-
yard, the operations of which were blighting the immediate neigh-
borhood. The court held that this did not constitute sufficient reason
to allow plaintiff also to operate a brickyard in the same residential
zone.
Three earlier cases dealt with the opposite side of the coin,
where the court found the degree of development to be such as to
have established a different character of the area than that found
by the legislative body.
In the "pre-Euclidian" zoning period, the court reviewed the
nature of land use along East Colfax Avenue, an interstate highway,
and determined that its strip commercial character precluded
certain limitations being imposed by the city council.66 Essentially
the same conclusion was reached in the first Hedgcock case 67
(supra, sec. I-A), where the court found that a requirement for
business building setbacks had been habitually ignored, and hence
could not be enforced against the plaintiff. In the Webber case,68
64 95 Colo. 337, 36 P.2d 161 (1934).
65 81 Colo. 344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927).
66 Weicker Transfer & Storage Co. v. Council of City & County of Denver, 75 Colo. 475, 226 Pac.
857 (1924).
67 Hedgcock v. People ex rel. Reed, 91 Colo. 156, 13 P.2d 264 (1932).
68 People ex ref. Friedman v. Webber, 110 Colo. 161, 132 P.2d 187 (1942).
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the court found concentrated commercial development along Colo-
rado Boulevard and along East Eighth Avenue, and determined












The second Hedgcock case"9 also dealt with the character of
an area, but the court's decision was based on discriminatory treat-
ment, rather than unreasonableness because of excessive non-con-
formance.
The Colorado court's position in these cases is one commonly
held in the country. The leading modern case is Lockard v. City of
Los Angeles.
70
E. Effect of Adjacent Heavily Traveled Street
A perennial problem in urban areas is posed by the sequence
of a street being improved (such as Colorado Boulevard, 71 Federal
Boulevard,72 or Sheridan Boulevard7 3), followed by a marked in-
crease in traffic, and followed in turn for demands for re-zoning
of already substantially developed single family residence areas
abutting this street. The usual demand is for business although
the business use often is uneconomic if allowed to develop. The
problem becomes more acute when business zoning already exists
across the street.
All of these factors were present in the Baum case74 where the
plaintiff wanted to erect a shopping center in a residence zone, on
property which abutted Sheridan Boulevard, and where Jefferson
County had business development and zoning on the opposite side
of the street. Here the court held that the decision as to the proper
zoning basically inhered in the legislative body, and that these facts
69 Hedgcock v. People ex rel. Arden Realty & Inv. Co., 98 Colo. 522, 57 P.2d 891 (1936).
70 33 Cal.2d 453, 202 P.2d 38. 7 A.L.R.2d 990 (1949).
71 Widened in average curb-to-curb mat width from about 48 feet to approximately 84 feet.
72 Widened in average curb-to-curb mat width from about 40 feet to approximately 60 feet.
73 Widened in average curb-to-curb mat width from between 30 and 40 feet to approximately
48 feet.
74 Baum v. Denver, 363 P.2d 688, 695 (Colo. 1961).
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alone did not warrant invalidating the residential zoning. (See
map 6.)
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The same general situation was in effect in the Shaffer case,
7
where improvements to Wadsworth Boulevard had greatly in-
creased traffic. No business zoning existed at the intersection. Here
the court observed: "[H]eavy traffic on an adjoining street is in-
sufficient to establish the unreasonableness of residential classifica-
tion."76 (See map 2 supra.)
In these cases, the court cites the long line of Illinois cases
75 Board of County Comm'rs v. Shaffer, 367 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1961).
76 Id. at 754.
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which have developed this rule,7T and also the leading modern
Michigan case of Robinson v. City of Broomfield Hills.
7 8
Many other Colorado cases have considered these facts, but
without establishing any general rules on the subject. Probably
the major Colorado case inconsistent in result with these modern
cases is the Webber case.7 9 (See map 5 supra.) Here the court noted
the business across the street, and to the north, and noted the heavy
traffic on Colorado Boulevard as considerations supporting the
granting of relief to the plaintiff.
II. RELATION OF ZONING TO RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
As a matter of law, restrictive covenants are agreements be-
tween or among private property owners, for their mutual benefit.
Zoning, on the other hand, is a governmental exercise of the police
power for the welfare of the public (supra, sec. I-A). Commonly,
the courts of the country have ruled that the two are not related,
and zoning is in no way limited by the restrictive covenant.80
Colorado has not ruled upon this point.
The general subject of the relation of zoning to restrictive
covenants appeared to be at issue in two recent cases, but no
definitive law was therein established. The 1960 case of Nelson v.
Farr8 raised this issue, and the trial court enjoined the city of
Greeley from zoning the land inconsistently with the restrictive
covenant. The supreme court, in dealing with the issue, found that
the restrictive covenant did not apply to the subject land.
The other case, Wellman v. Haug,82 had both restrictive cove-
nants and zoning at issue, but they were handled as separate issues,
and no interrelationship between the two was considered by the
court.
III. EFFECT OF ZONING ON OTHER UNITS OF GOVERNMENT
The case of Reber v. South Lakewood Sanitation Dist.83 dealt
with the proposal of a sanitation district in Jefferson County to
build a sewage disposal plant in a residential neighborhood. The
zoning ordinance neither allowed nor prohibited the construction
of the plant, but provided that the board of adjustment could per-
mit the plant to be built in such districts when required for the
public health. The district made a special appearance before the
board of adjustment, to challenge the jurisdiction of the board. The
district's challenge was overruled, and the board denied the permit.
The district appealed to the court. The district court conducted a
triaf de novo on the issues of necessity and location of the plant,
and overruled the board. The discussion of the facts by the supreme
court is somewhat confusing because of the further statutory re-
quirement for planning board review of the location of proposed
77 LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 6 Ifl.2d 22, 126 N.E.2d 643 (1955); Herzog Building
Corp. v. City of Des Plaines, 3 111.2d 206, 119 N.E.2d 732 (1954); Kinney v. City of Joliet, 411 III.
289, 103 N.E.2d 473 (1952); Mundelein Estates Inc. v. Village of Mundelein, 409 111. 291, 99 N.E.2d
144 (1951).
78 350 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d 166 (1957).
79 People ex rel. Friedman v. Webber, 110 Colo. 161, 132 P.2d 187 (1942).
80 V McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.09 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 2 Metzenbaum,
Zoning 1109 (2d ed. 1955, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning ch. 74 (3d ed. 1960);
Rhyne, Municipal Law § 32.34 (1957); 1 Yokely, Zoning Law and Practice § 35 (2d ed. 1953, and
Supp. 1961); 58 Am. Jur. Zoning J 4 (1948); 101 C.J.S. Zoning §§ 39, 140 (1958).
81 143 Colo. 423, 354 P.2d 163 (1960).
82 360 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1961).
83 362 P.2d 877 (Colo. 1961).
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public facilities. 84 However, the court based its affirmation of the
district court ruling on the enabling act for the establishment of
sanitation districts,85 and stated the rule as follows:
The relationship which the General Assembly esta-
blished by C.R.S. '53, 106-2-9, as amended by chapter 193
of the Session Laws of 1959, is a relationship which has
been found to exist by courts even without such definite
statutory direction as found in the statute. In the absence
of such statute, courts of last resort have recognized that
districts, authorities and other state authorized governmen-
tal subdivisions have the power to overrule or disregard the
restrictions of county or municipal zoning regulations. 6
As is well evidenced by the numerous cases cited by the court in
support of this statement, the general rule is commonly applied.87
In some jurisdictions, proprietary functions of one unit of govern-
ment are subject to the zoning authority of another, while the
governmental functions are not.88
However, some argument can be made against the general rule.
Assuming, as was true in the instant case, that the district had
alternative means of accomplishing the sewage disposal function
for which it was created, should the district be completely free to
select any system which it deems in its own best interest, irrespec-
tive of the damage which might be caused by the selection which
it made (even if it remains liable in law for responding in money
damages for the nuisance it creates) ?
Under facts like those in the principal case, there are two local
subdivisions of government, a county and a special district; both
have their grants of authority by legislative enactment; one is
charged with a rather broad and comprehensive concern with the
public welfare, the other is charged with a strictly limited concern.
Is the general welfare better served by giving the limited govern-
mental (or "quasi-governmental" as it is sometimes called) juris-
84 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 106-2-9 (Supp. 1960).
85 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 89-5-1 (1953).
86 Supra note 83, at 879.
8T Decatur Park Dist. v. Becker, 368 III. 422, 14 N.E.2d 490 (1938); Puhr v. Kansas City, 142Kan. 704, 51 P.2d 911 (1935); In re Petition, City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 480, 14 N.W.2d 140 (1944);State ex ref. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. 1960); State ex ref. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.Farrss, 340 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. 1957); Aviation Services v. Board of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275, 119 A.2d761 (1956); Town of Broomfield v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 18 N.J. 237, 113 A.2d 658 (1955);State ex ref. Ohio Turnpike Comm. v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 170 N.E.2d 345 (1952), cert. denied,
Balduff v. Ohio Turnpike Comm., 344 U.S. 865; Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair Township,
337 Pa. 323, 105 A.2d 287 (1954).
88 Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 970 (1958).
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diction exemption from the generally applicable regulations esta-
blished by the broader jurisdiction?
IV. STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
In addition to defining the standards for legislative action,
recent Colorado zoning cases have also developed some guides for
judicial review. The guides are as follows:
1. A zoning ordinance is presumed valid, and more than a
preponderance of the evidence is required to overcome this
presumption.
2. The judiciary may not perform a legislative function.
3. A general legislative declaration of the basis of zoning
amendments is to be interpreted as a legislative finding on
specific amendment requests.
In many respects, these guides have the general effect of extending
to the field of zoning the same concepts which are applicable in
other fields of municipal law.
A. Presumption of Validity; Degree of Proof
While the Colorado Supreme Court had ruled on a number of
occasions on the general question of presumptions attending re-
view of the constitutionality of various municipal ordinances, it
did not speak with respect to zoning until 1961.
In the Baum case,8 9 Mr. Justice Day, speaking for the court,
commented that "heretofore this court has not stated or pronounced
any definite or exact standards for determining the validity of a
zoning ordinance."90 The opinion reviewed a number of earlier
Colorado cases dealing with the presumption of validity of muni-
cipal ordinances on other subjects, and continued: "A zoning ordi-
nance, like other legislative enactments, is presumed to be valid,
and one assailing it bears the burden of overcoming that presump-
tion. and courts indulge every intendment in favor of its validity."91
The Baum case described the degree of proof required to over-
come the presumption to be "clear and convincing. '92 In the Frankel
case, Mr. Justice Day described the degree of proof as "establishing
the invalidity thereof beyond a reasonable doubt. '93 Generally,
these standards are well accepted. Rhyne, in his notable text on
municipal law, points out: "Municipal ordinances are entitled to a
presumption of validity, and will be sustained unless clearly in-
valid. In addition, one challenging the validity of an ordinance not
only has the burden of proof, but also must show that he is subject
to and aggrieved by its provisions."94 The numerous cases he cites
in support of his comment are indicative of the prevalence of this
principle.
B. Prohibition Against Judicial Legislation
Several recent cases dealt with the problem of judicial invasion
of the legislative sphere. In essence, in cases of this type, the trial
court declares the zoning void (which is within the realm of proper
judicial review), and then goes on to grant a specific use or a
89 Baum v. Denver, 363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961).
90 Id. at 692.
91 Id. at 691.
92 Id. at 694.
93 Frankel v. Denver, 363 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Colo. 1961).
94 Rhyne, Municipal Law 238 (1957). Footnote superscripts omitted from the quotation.
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particular zone which should be applied to plaintiff's property. This
combination is what is termed "judicial legislation."
In the case of Nelson v. Farr,5 the city of Greeley zoned land
for business purposes. The trial court "in effect, re-zoned the prop-
erty as residential A and prohibited the city from altering such
zoning or enforcing any zoning in conflict with the court's deter-
mination that the property be devoted exclusively to single family
dwellings."96 . This action by the trial court was held to be judicial
legislation, and was consequently reversed by the supreme court.
In the Baum case,97 the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
denial of a petition to permit construction of a shopping center
across the street from a business zone. The supreme court com-
mented: "The selection of a boundary line between use districts is
a legislative function, peculiarly within the power of the municipal
legislative body. 98 The same point was reiterated in the Frankel
case,99 where the court affirmed the trial court's refusal to permit
the applicant to build an apartment in a single-family residence
zone on a site about 100 feet from the boundary of an apartment
zone. (See map 3 supra.)
The Shaffer case100 was a somewhat extreme case of judicial
legislation wherein the trial court's decision resulted in four dif-
ferent zonings of one intersection. (See map 2 supra.) In reversing
the trial court, the supreme court again pointed out the prohibition
against judicial invasion of the legislative sphere of responsibility.
Applying the same principle, the Denver Buick case 01 vacated
a district court order directing that B-5 (central business district)
zoning be applied to a certain large area of land in Denver.
Earlier cases did not recognize this problem of separation of
powers. Once the supreme court decided that, under common law
and code pleadings, a writ of mandamus for the issuance of a build-
ing permit was a proper remedy in a zoning case,10 2 the inevitable
result was that the court was not merely determining that the
existing regulation was void, but also was determining what was
the proper regulation. This was not illogical in the light of the fact
95 143 Colo. 423, 354 P.2d 163 (1960).
96 Id. at 429, 354 P.2d at 166.
97 Baum v. Denver, 363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961).
98 Id. at 696.
99 Frankel v. Denver, 363 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Colo. 1961).
100 Board of County Comm'rs v. Shaffer, 367 P.2d 751, 755 (Colo. 1961).
101 City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 139, 347 P.2d 919, 930 (1960).
102 Hedgcock v. People ex rel. Reed, 91 Colo. 155, 158, 13 P.2d 264, 265 (1932), contains a review
of mandamus as a remedy in a zoning controversy.
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that early zoning ordinances permitted a quasi-judicial body, the
board of adjustment, to vary the use requirements of the zoning
ordinance, and upon appeal, the court could overrule the decision
of the board. Probably the most extreme of these early cases were
the second Hedgcock case, 03 where the court authorized the exten-

























and the Webber case,10 4 where the court extended a conforming
business development to adjacent property located on the end of
the existing zone. (See map 5 supra.)
With the development of the concept that land use is of the
essence in zoning ordinances (discussed in the introduction of this
103 Hedgcock v. People ex rel. Arden Realty Co., 98 Colo. 522, 57 P.2d 891 (1936).
104 People ex rel. Friedman v. Webber, 110 Colo. 161, 132 P.2d 187 (1942).
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article), the recent trends of legislative elimination of administra-
tive authorization to make land use changes and the judicial recog-
nition of the legislative character of this determination are parallel
and consistent. This general prohibition of invasion of the legislative
sphere by the judiciary is consistent with the general principles of
constitutional and municipal law in this country. 10 5
C. Effect of Legislative Declaration of Basis for Amendments
Most city councils in Colorado do not prepare statements of the
factors considered when passing an ordinance. This leaves the courts
free to explore the realm of possible reasons underlying the action
of the city council, when deciding the reasonableness of the ordi-
nance. The desirability of the council incorporating into the ordi-
nance a statement of its reasoning is a matter of considerable dif-
ference of opinion among attorneys. The 1956 Denver zoning ordi-
nance contains the following legislative declaration:
For the purpose of establishing and maintaining sound,
stable and desirable development within the territorial
limits of the municipality, this ordinance, and as here used
the term ordinance shall be deemed to include the official
map, shall not be amended except to correct a manifest
error in the ordinance or, because of changed or changing
conditions in a particular area or in the municipality gen-
erally, to re-zone an area or extend the boundary thereof,
only as reasonably necessary to the promotion of the public
health, safety or general welfare.
10 6
The court was interpreting the ordinance containing this clause
in the Frankel case.10 7 In this particular instance, the council had
refused to grant a re-zoning of three parcels of land from Single
family residence (R-1) to apartment zoning (R-3). The court held
that the council was bound by this declaration of policy, and hence,
it was applicable to specific council actions, observing:
By rejecting the bill for an ordinance to re-zone a small
part of the subject R-1 district, Council necessarily deter-
mined that there was no manifest error in the classification
of plaintiffs' lots. Council also determined that the asserted
changed or changing conditions in the particular area or in
the municipality generally did not require re-zoning of a
small section or part of the R-1 district. In effect Council
also determined that the requested re-zoning was not rea-
sonably necessary for the promotion of public health, safety
or general welfare. 08
V. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A number of procedural issues were raised in the recent zoning
cases. The first dealt with who was eligible to sue. As a general rule,
the only one who can sue is an adversely affected party. 10 9 In the
1058 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.278 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 1 Metzen-
bourn, Zoning 101 (2e ed. rev. 1957); 1 Rothkopf, Zoning and Planning ch. 36 (3d ed. 1960); 1
Yokely, Zoning Law or.d Practice §185 (2d ed. 1953, and Supp. 1961); 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 323 (1958).
106 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code § 618.1 (1956).
107 Frankel v. Denver, 363 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1961).
108 Id. at 1067.
109 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.292 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 2 Metzen-
bourn, Zoning 1020 (2d ed. 1955, and Supp. 1961); 2 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning ch. 69 (3d ed.
1960); Rhyne, Municipal Corporations §§ 32-37 (1957); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1143 (1954); 58 Am. Jur.
Zoning J 253 (1948); 101 C.J.S. Zoning §§ 20, 321 (1958).
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case of Westwood Meat Market, Inc. v. McLucas,110 plaintiffs were
business owners located at some distance from the subject property,
who were suing to have a business zone declared void. The court
held none of the plaintiffs were aggrieved persons, and added:
"Zoning may not be used as a means of stifling proposed competi-
tion.""1 " The court cited six Colorado cases in support of this posi-
tion, most of the cases dealing with zoning.1
12
A second procedural issue was whether the plaintiff can sue
without having first exhausted his administrative remedies. In the
Baum case,113 plaintiffs had neither made application for a building
permit, nor sought relief from the board of adjustment. The court
summarized the rule as follows:
The plaintiffs' contention is that the zoning ordinance
results in a confiscatory reduction of the plaintiffs' prop-
erty, prohibits the use thereof for business and commercial
purposes, and prevents "any use, service or income to be de-
rived from the property." This attack is directed to the
entire ordinance as it affects their property and not to any
specific provision or provisions thereof. They contend that
the ordinance, in effect, constitutes a present and continu-
ing invasion of their property rights. Under the allegations
of the complaint, jurisdiction of the court is clearly esta-
blished.
114
This rule is also generally in accord with the prevailing rule.115
The third procedural point was one upon which the courts are
divided. In the Holly Development case," 6 plaintiff used certiorari
to test the action of the board of county commissioners in re-zoning
certain land. Usually, certiorari is a writ for testing the jurisdiction
or the abuse of discretion of an administrator, a court, or quasi-
judicial body. 117 This was the application in all the cases cited as
precedent for the court's action. However, in the instant case, the
action of the board of county commissioners was construed to be
legislative in character. In commenting on the use of the writ, the
court quoted Corpus Juris Secundum as indicative of the general
rule: " [W] henever there is no direct remedy provided for review,
the writ of certiorari lies, even though some other remedy can be
conceived as possible in the future.""18
The Holly Development case also dealt with the general prob-
lem of notice. Here, the notice of the required zoning hearing failed
to indicate that zoning was involved in the hearing, stating merely
"Charlou Park, Third Filing. A-2 to R.," and stating the date, time
110 361 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1961).
111 Id. at 778.
112 City & County of Denver v. Redding Miller, 141 Colo. 269, 347 P.2d 954 (1960); City &
County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1960); Erickson v. Groomer,
139 Colo. 32, 336 P.2d 296 (1959); City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, 136 Colo. 482, 319
P.2d 490 (1958); Board of Adjustment v. Iwerks, 136 Colo. 578, 316 P.2d 576 (1957); Cliff v. Bilett,
125 Colo. 138, 241 P.2d 437 (1952).
113 Baum v. Denver, 363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961).
114 Id. at 691.
115 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.283 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 1 Metzen.
bourn, Zoning 708 (2d ed. 1955, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rathkopf, Planning and Zoning ch. 35 (3d ed.
1960); 2 Rathkopf, Planning and Zoning ch. 65 (3d ed. 1960, and Supp. 1961); 58 Am. Jur. Zoning
§5 243-45 (1948); 101 C.J.S. Zoning 5 321 (1958).
116 Holly Dev., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 140 Colo. 95, 342 P.2d 1032 (1959).
117 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.286 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rathkopf,
Zoning and Planning chs. 64-65 (3d ed. 1960); 58 Am. Jur. Zoning § 233 (1948); 101 C.J.S. Zoning
335 (1958).
118 Supra note 116, at 99, 342 P.2d at 1035.
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and place of the hearing. The court held that this notice was void
on two grounds: (1) It did not inform the public of anything. (2)
The original zoning was not as set forth in the notice. The court
further held that the deficiency was jurisdictional in nature, and
the subsequent appearance of the plaintiffs at the hearing did not
confer jurisdiction.11 9
In the same case, the court construed Colo. Rev. Stat. § 106-2-11
(1953), which requires that zoning maps be attached to a proposed
zoning resolution. In this case, the resolution recited that the maps
were attached, but in fact they were not. The court pointed out
that the omission was not an oversight, but that the illness of a
draftsman had resulted in the maps not being prepared. This, the
court held, was a fatal omission. 20 The court also observed as dic-
tum: "It is the duty of the zoning officials to have proper informa-
tion available in a public office so that those affected can deter-
mine their rights and privileges, as well as the duties and restric-
tions applicable to them.'
12 1
In the case of Trailer Towns, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment,
122
the court interpreted an introduction to a printed version of a Jef-
ferson County zoning ordinance, which read: "In order to meet the
convenience of the property owners, realtors, and other interested
citizens of Jefferson County, the County Planning Commission and
Board of County Commissioners have printed this resolution for
public distribution. * * *",123 Plaintiff had used this resolution, read-
ing it literally, and acting accordingly. The court in essence held
that under the circumstances, he was entitled to do so, and that
all parties to the proceedings were obliged to abide by the exact
text of the resolution.
2 4
The last procedural issue to be considered involved the 1956
Denver zoning ordinance requiring reports on requested zoning
amendments to be made to the city council by the planning office,
the department of zoning administration, and others. '2 In the
Frankel case,'2 6 the planning board report had noted that the land-
owners in the area for which re-zoning was requested were opposed
to the request. The city council had denied the request, but had
not stated its specific reasons. Plaintiff alleged illegal delegation
of power. The court noted that the council was not bound by the
department reports, and added: "We know of no case-and none is
cited-invalidating legislation because machinery is provided there-
in to afford affected parties opportunity to protest departure from
the terms of an act or ordinance. "1'7
VI. OTHER PROBLEMS
A variety of special problems arose in the recent cases.
In the Trailer Towns case.'12 8 the court was construing the term
'any residential district." Specifically, the R-C (Residential Com-
119 Id. at 100, 342 P.2d at 1035.
120 Id. at 103, 342 P.2d at 1036.
121 Id. at 106, 342 P.2d at 1038.
122 144 Colo. 340, 356 F.2d 251 (1960).
123 Id. at 343, 356 P.2o at 253.
124 Ibid.
125 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code §§ 618.4, 618.5 (1956).
126 Frankel v. Denver, 363 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1961).
127 Id. at 1066.
128 Trailer Towns, Inc., v. Board of Adjustment, 144 Colo. 340, 356 P.2d 251 (1960).
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mercial) zone in Jefferson County had as a use by right "any use
permitted in any residential district." Later, the county created a
district known as a R-T (Residential Trailer) zone. Plaintiff wanted
to erect a trailer camp on land zoned R-C. The court held that the
zoning resolution had to be construed as written, and that the uses
in the R-T zone were permitted in the R-C zone. The court com-
mented: "It may be that such was not intended by the planning
commission, but the plaintiff was and is justified in being guided
by the wording of the resolution rather than by a secret or un-
expressed intent of the commission. ' '129 A similar conclusion was
reached by the Colorado Supreme Court in the earlier cases of
Jones v. Board of Adjustment,13 People ex rel. Gremmon v. Hedg-
cock,131 and Di Salle v. Giggal,132 where, in essence, the court said
that zoning ordinances had to be interpreted as written. As a gen-
eral proposition, this is self evident, and is a common position for
the courts to take in cases of this type.
13
In the case of City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian
Church,"4 the Englewood zoning ordinance permitted churches in
the R-1 and R-2 districts only with the approval of the board of
adjustment. The majority decision deemed this provision to be a
prohibition, and voided the requirement on the grounds that it had
no relationship to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.
135
The concurring opinion, written by Mr. Justice McWilliams, deemed
the provision to grant a permissive right to build, rather than an
absolute right, but held that the board of adjustment had acted
arbitrarily in refusing its approval.136 The courts in the country
are divided on the issue raised by this case. 137 Presumably, the
question of freedom of religion under the First Amendment to the
129 Id. at 342, 356 P.2d at 253.
130 119 Colo. 420, 204 P.2d 560 (1949).
131 106 Colo. 300, 104 P.2d 607 (1940).
132 128 Colo. 208, 261 P.2d 499 (1953).
133 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.71 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rothkopf,
Zoninq and Plonninq $ 8-1 (3d ed. 1960); Rhyne, Municipal Law 243 (1957); 57 Am. Jur. Zoning
11 (1948); 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 130 (1958).
134 363 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1961).
135 Id. at 175.
136 Id. at 177.
137 8 McQuillin, Municipol Corporations § 25.128, notes 9, 10 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961);
2 Metzenbaum, Zoning 1461 (2d ed. 1955, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning ch. 19
(3d e-1. 1960); Rhyne, M.'.,r' ol Law § 3".4R (1957); 2 Yokelv. Zoning Low and Practice § 222 (2d









United States Constitution was not raised in this case, although it
has been an argument in some cases in this field.
13
8
In the case of Wellman v. Haug,139 the court was interpreting
the term: "Lot area." The court ruled that this was not necessarily
synonymous with a platted lot. It defined the term for zoning pur-
poses as follows: "Under zoning practice and in the present case
it means any contiguous quantity of land in the possession of, owned
by, or recorded as the property of the same claimant, person or
company.' 40 The case cited a number of cases from other jurisdic-
tions in accord, but none from Colorado.
41
Finally, in the Frankel case,142 the court dealt with the problem
of the special treatment of non-conforming uses. Plaintiff claimed
that the zoning ordinance was discriminatory because owners of
non-conforming uses were treated differently than other owners
of land in the same zone. This argument was raised many times in
the early zoning cases, and the United States Supreme Court dis-
cussed the matter at length in the Euclid case.14 The argument was
rejected by the Colorado court, based on the Euclid case, and also
a number of early cases from other jurisdictions. 144 In essence, the
Denver Buick case, 145 decided in 1960, held that the existing rights
of owners of non-conforming properties had to be protected. The
Frankel case took the next logical step required to preserve the
general constitutionality of zoning as an exercise of the police
power.
CONCLUSION
Zoning in the modern urban community is a tool with great
potentialities for good or evil. It involves a constant process of
striking a balance of the public interest in stabilization of develop-
ment on the one hand and in accommodation to changing conditions
on the other. The recent cases decided by the Colorado Supreme
Court have established rules for the guidance of both legislative
action and judicial review, and these rules pertain to both substan-
tive and procedural aspects of the zoning process. Under these
recent decisions, the regulating jurisdiction and the landowner
being regulated also have their respective rights and duties more
clearly defined. Adherence to these rules, combined with compe-
tent technical work on the zoning regulations themselves, should
result in a more responsible exercise of public authority to safe-
guard the public interest without, at the same time, unnecessarily
limiting individual freedom.
138 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning § 19-1 (3d ed. 1960).
139 360 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1961).
140 Id. at 974.
141 See also 25A Words and Phrases 419, "Lot" (1961).
142 Frankel v. Denver, 363 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1961).
143 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Ca., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
144 Magruder v. Redwood City, 203 Cal. 665, 265 Pac. 806 (1928); Miller v. Board of Public Works,
195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925); Marquis v. City of Waterloo, 210 Iowa 439, 228 N.W. 870 (1930);
Sampere v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 776, 117 So. 827 (1928); aff'd 279 U.S. 812; Brett v.
Building Comm'rs, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924); Ballard v. Roth, 141 Misc. 319, 253 N.Y.S. 6
(1931); Baxley v. City of Frederick, 133 Okla. 84, 271 Pac. 257 (1928); Lombardo v. City of Dallas,
47 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), off'd 124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475 (1934); State ex rel. Carter v.
Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).
145 City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1960).
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